DePaul University

Via Sapientiae
Faculty Publications – College of Liberal Arts
and Social Sciences

College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

2014

The March to Market Reform in Central America
Rose Spalding
depaul university, rspaldin@depaul.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/lasfacpubs
Part of the Latin American Languages and Societies Commons

Recommended Citation
Rose J. Spalding, “The March to Market Reform in Central America”, from Contesting Trade in Central
America: Market Reform and Resistance (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014): pp. 22-60.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via
Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications – College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences
by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Contesting Trade
in Central America
Market Reform and Resistance
BY ROSE J. SPALDING

University of Texas Press Z--S Austin

Copyright © 2014 by the University of Texas Press
All rights reserved
First paperback edition, 2015
Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to:
Permissions
University of Texas Press
PO. Box 7819
Austin, TX 78713-7819
http://utpress.utexas.edu/index.php/rp-form
0 The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO
Z39.48-1992 (R1997) (Permanence of Paper).
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Spalding, Rose J.
Contesting trade in Central America : market reform and resistance / by Rose J.
Spalding. — First edition.
pages
cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-292-75459-1 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-4773-0764-9 (paperback)
1. Free trade—Central America. 2. Central America—Commerce. 3. Central
America —Commerical policy. 4. Central America—Foreign economic relations.
5. CAFTA (Free trade agreement) (2005). I. Title.
HF1782.S63 2013
382L91728—dc23
2013019668
doi: 10.7560/754591

Cont ent s

List of Acronyms and Initialisms
Acknowledgments

ix

xix

Introduction, Overview, and Methods

i

1.

The March to Market Reform in Central America

20

2.

Rule Makers and Rule Takers: Negotiating CAFTA

61

3.

Resistance: Competing Voices

4.

Ratification Politics: In the Chamber and in the Street

5.

After CAFTA: Anti-Mining Movements, Investment Disputes,

95

and New Organizational Territory

126

158

6.

Electoral Challenges and Transitions

7.

Post-Neoliberalism and Alternative Approaches to Change

188

Appendix A. Note on Interview Methodology

206

240

Appendix B. Presidential Election Results: Costa Rica, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua, 1978-2011

Notes

247

Bibliography
Index

305

269

244

CHAPTER 1

The M arch t o M arket Ref orm in Cent ral America

Laissezfaire was planned.
po l a n y i

(2001 [1944])

The market is omnipresent. Those outside the market might as well disappear.
COLBURN AND CRUZ

(2007)

Introduction
Market reform made deep inroads in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s,
with Central American countries among the regional leaders. Their market
shift was noteworthy, given the strong statist features of these economies in
the early 1980s. In Costa Rica, then Latin America’s solitary social democ
racy, the state maintained a monopoly in the banking, electricity, and tele
communications sectors, as well as a substantial national role in public health
and education. Nicaragua had just undergone a revolutionary transition in
1979, and the new Sandinista government controlled banking, foreign trade,
and a large slice of agricultural production. A reform government in El Salva
dor, attempting to forestall a revolutionary takeover, had also expanded state
economic roles, with a banking takeover and a push for agrarian reform. Over
the next twenty years, however, all three countries would experience a sharp
shift toward the market.
Databases measuring policy reform permit a detailed analysis of the timing
and sequencing of economic change. One of the first, by Morley, Machado,
and Pettinato (1999), used annual data from 1970 to 1995 to construct a re
form index for seventeen Latin American countries.1 Their scores indicate
that Costa Rican economic policy shifted strongly toward a market model in
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1987, with marked liberalization in four of five economic arenas (trade, the
domestic financial system, external capital transactions, and tax reform); only
in privatization did it trail behind.
El Salvador’s reform effort fell behind the Latin American average in the
second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. After the ARENA victory in the
1989 presidential race, however, economic policy moved quickly in a neolib
eral direction. Bank privatization occurred in 1990, followed by liberalization
of capital accounts in 1991 and tax reform in 1992. With this spate of policy
changes in the early 1990s, El Salvador surged ahead of Costa Rica as the re
gion’s neoliberal leader.
Nicaragua moved against the regional tide during the 1980s, its decade of
revolutionary government, and was not included in the Morley, Machado,
and Pettinato data set. Economic collapse and the defeat of the Sandinistas
in 1990, however, brought marked policy change under the subsequent Na
tional Opposition Union (UNO) government. By the middle of the 1990s,
Nicaragua had also undergone extensive market reform. An IDB assessment
of Latin American structural reform for 1985-1999 by Eduardo Lora (2001),
which includes data for Nicaragua for the 1994-1999 period, placed it above
the Latin American average (see table l.l).2 In this framework, Nicaragua
emerged as the leading reformer in Central America at the end of the 1990s,
its high overall score driven by light financial and labor regulations. El Sal
vador, though lagging on financial and labor reform, was among the Latin
American leaders on trade liberalization and privatization, giving it an inter
mediate place on this index in 1999. Even Costa Rica, where modest privati
zation levels resulted in the lowest of the three scores, had liberalized substan
tially across this fifteen-year period. Its 1999 score of .557 was far removed
from its score of .306 in 1985.
Although each assessment uses a somewhat different measurement of
structural reform, they all document a pro-market shift across time in this re
gion? These countries began with numerous constraints on market processes;
all of them ended this period with much more open economies. How can we
explain the marked shift toward neoliberalism?

Market Reform Theory
Academic explanations of market liberalization commonly divide along three
dimensions. The first division concerns the extent to which the primary im
pulse for liberalization is traced to external as opposed to internal forces. Ana
lysts emphasizing the role of external actors generally focus on the direct

Table 1.1. Index of structural reform
Average
7989

1990

7997

7992

1993

1994

7995

7996

7997

7998

7999

.421

.420

.425

.420

.440

.446

.453

.536

.533

.542

.557

.557

.348

.362

.399

.401

.416

.494

.505

.488

.497

.489

.572

.566

.574

.574

.580

.623

.617

.598

.522

.539

.548

.554

.573

.583

1986

1987

1988

.306

.387

.428

.349

.353

.351

Country

1985

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Nicaragua**
Latin American

.341

.360

.377

.384

.399

.436

average1
Source: Lora (2001,30).
*Nicaragua was not included in this study until 1994.
t Average does not include the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

.455

.484

.503
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or indirect impact of international financial institutions (the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank), powerful states directing them (the United
States or G5 countries), or international capital. Conversely, explanations that
focus on internal or domestic processes commonly highlight the role of tech
nocratic officials in charge of lead economic ministries.
The second debate focuses on the competing roles of ideas versus material
interests in advancing structural reform. Proponents of the ideological posi
tion emphasize the impact of epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs
in shaping a value consensus in favor of market reform. Interpretations em
phasizing material gain, in contrast, focus on the power of specific business
interests to mold a favorable environment and extract rewards using tech
niques such as marketing, lobbying or bribery.
The third debate explores the pivotal roles of political elites (a top down
model) versus mass preferences (a bottom up model) in shaping neoliberal
reforms. Whereas the former approach concentrates on elite negotiation and
decision making, the latter focuses on public opinion and voting behavior to
explain how popular pressure affects policy change.
The present study contends that much of the previous work on market
reform casts the question too narrowly and fails to grapple with the inter
sections among these various perspectives. My approach develops a multi
phase theoretical framework that breaks the reform process into three parts
and focuses on the shifting actors that dominate in each. The processes that
catalyze and shape the first phase, reform initiation, differ from those that
define the second, reform deepening, and the third, reform persistence. Reform
initiation refers to the actions that introduce a sharp break from past prac
tices and begin to move a country through the early stages of stabilization and
structural reform. Reform deepening focuses on the layering in of additional,
complementary policy changes that continue to advance marketization, as in
ongoing tariff reduction, segmented privatization processes, or banking lib
eralization. Reform persistence turns attention to the processes that hold re
form in place across multiple administrations, as new norms and practices
consolidate.
This study argues that external actors are critical agents during reform ini
tiation, providing both financial resources to ease the process and detailed
policy templates to chart the course. The government officials with whom
they collaborate generally have little expertise or experience with the new ap
proach; in this early stage, local authorities depend heavily on assistance from
foreign donors and the multilateral lenders to launch the project.
As reform enters the deepening phase, domestic actors assume greater
prominence. Local technocrats exercise leadership as norm entrepreneurs
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and ideational sponsors. Research centers and think tanks foster epistemic
communities of market advocates who explain, implement, and legitimize
ongoing reform. Business pioneers, some internationally networked, reorga
nize investment and production around opening opportunities, and stateelite relations recalibrate. As economic activities shift, displacing previously
privileged elites and forming a critical mass of new economic groups, business
actors become important advocates of continuing reform.
In the final phase, reform persistence depends on broader political reorga
nization. Pro-market political parties and coalitions present a steady sequence
of reform candidates, and voters provide them with continuing support. At
this point, public preferences for market reform play a critical role in explain
ing the durability of the new arrangement, even in the face of episodic pro
tests and strikes.
What follows is a review of market reform theory, which foregrounds the
arguments embedded in a multiphase theoretical framework.
International Actors and Reform Initiation:
The IMF, Dominant States, and International Capital

Studies tracing market reform in developing countries commonly empha
size the contributions of external actors, often focusing on the International
Monetary Fund. During the 1980s debt crisis and in subsequent lending
agreements, IMF advisers used leverage over vital resources to encourage the
scuttling of state intervention and protectionist measures in favor of structural
adjustment. A wide array of mechanisms (macro- and microconditionality,
tranching, signaling to private creditors, de facto cross-conditionality, discre
tionary waivers on benchmarks and targets, etc.) served to leverage and pace
policy reform (Vreeland 2007; Stallings 1992; Kahler 1992).
Focusing just on nonconcessional loans to middle-income borrowers, Copelovitch (2010) identified 197 IMF loans to forty-seven countries between
1984 and 2003. Lending occurred across time periods and regions, moving
through the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the postcommunist
transitions in the 1990s, and, after a period of decline and internal reform,
with new energy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Pop-Eleches 2009).
Beginning with few specified conditions, the IMF loans came to include a
large number of performance requirements accompanied by prolonged super
vision. Vreeland (2007, 58) identified forty-nine countries with continuous,
long-term (ten to twenty-one years) participation in IMF programs between
1967 and 2000.
IMF lending tended to follow external financial crisis,4 but terms and con
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ditions varied, even when triggered by similar events. Significant differences
in loan size, timing, and requirements prompted closer academic examination
of lending politics, and competing explanations of Fund behavior emerged.
One set of arguments concerned the extent to which IMF lending reflected
the preferences of powerful IMF shareholder countries, which manipulated
Fund decisions in pursuit of their own national interests.
Using statistical analysis of UN voting and IMF lending, and controlling
for loan need, Strom Thacker (1999) determined that countries that shifted
their voting patterns to favor positions that the U.S. State Department ident ified as important were more likely to receive IMF loans. This finding, sug
gesting that the U.S. government used Fund resources to reward geopolitical
allies, was supported by Randall Stone’s (2004) research on the link between
U.S. foreign aid in Africa and Eastern Europe and IMF flexibility even in
the event of noncompliance with loan conditions. Comparing IMF lending
across time and regions (in Latin America during the debt crisis, in Eastern
Europe during the postcommunist transition, and in Latin America during
the 1990s), Pop-Eleches (2009) also found evidence of geopolitical influence
on IMF behavior, at least in the Eastern European cases. Such findings are
consistent with Realist theory, which assumes that powerful countries use ac
cess to resources to increase their power and advance their strategic interests.
Alternative claims about international lending shifted the focus away
from geopolitical interests of nation-states and highlighted the influence of
powerful business groups (Cox 2008; Harvey 2005). William I. Robinson’s
(2003), neo-Gramscian analysis employed the construct of a “transnational
elite,” formed by a hegemonic bloc of global business leaders. This domi
nant class was found to direct a “transnational state” comprising interna
tional financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, and regional development
banks) along with critical state segments (the U.S. Treasury Department and
USAID). Robinson described the emerging economic elite as deracinated, no
longer headquartered in or privileging the North, but linked cross-nationally
through corporate mergers, licenses, and subcontracts in ever-denser global
networks. According to this argument, global elites used direct and indirect
instruments to compel market openings and the elimination of national bartiers that constrain the international flow of capital and production. The re
moval of impediments to capital and trade flows through market reform in
turn facilitated the consolidation of transnationalized elite power.5
Structuralist arguments, which tend to assume homogeneity and dura
bility of elite interests and uncomplicated control over national and interna
tional institutions, are ill equipped to explain policy variation, inconsistency,
and change over time. They can, however, capture a subterranean exercise of
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power and general convergence of elite interests. This theoretical approach
is reinforced by some finely tuned quantitative studies that identified ways
in which the needs of finance capital shaped the behavior of the IMF and
its main shareholders. For example, Broz and Hawes (2006) demonstrate
that U.S. congressional support for IMF bailouts tended to be stronger when
large obligations to U.S. commercial banks were at stake. Mark Copelovitch s
(2010) study of nonconcessionary IMF loans found that lending followed the
combined preferences of G5 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Ger
many, and Japan) countries, preferences that were shaped by the intensity and
heterogeneity of G5 commercial bank exposure.
Some analysts of IMF lending question this approach and find the em
phasis on the power of northern states and national financial interests to be
overstated. Using principal-agent theory to explore the gap between the pref
erences of powerful states that determine the Fund’s governing board and
the policies pursued by the organization, a number of studies have inter
preted the Fund as possessing some measure of autonomy.6 Much of this lit
erature centers on how the norms and values that permeate the institution
shift over time. Looking at a range of IMF and World Bank initiatives, in
cluding debt and poverty relief and gender empowerment, Park and Vetter
lein (2010) highlighted the role of ideas and nonmaterially powerful actors in
the rise and fall of policy norms. This constructivist approach focused on the
role of “norm entrepreneurs” who advanced policy change through a threestage cycle of emergence, stabilization, and contestation. In a careful study of
the changes in IMF policy positions, Chwieroth (2010) used data on profes
sional training characteristics of over 400 IMF staff to explore the relation
ship between different schools of thought in the economics profession, IMF
recruitment patterns, and the rise and fall of Fund commitment to capital
account liberalization between 1944 and 2009.
All of these approaches, whether emphasizing dominant countries, inter
national economic forces, or the internal norms of international financial in
stitutions, highlight the role of external actors in the advancement of neolib
eral reform. An alternative approach centers on the impact of domestic actors.
Domestic Actors and Deepening Reform:
Technocrats and Business Elites

The ability of external actors to demand domestic economic policy changes
like trade liberalization is obviously limited, even in poor countries histori
cally influenced by the United States or international financial institutions.
Except in times of crisis (and, arguably, even during crisis moments), the
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power of external financial agents to determine policy outcomes is normally
constrained by the interplay of domestic forces (competing elite networks,
institutional arrangements, bureaucracies, etc.). International lenders may
provide a catalyst for reform initiation, but the layering in of market policies
(policy deepening) and implementation of reform require internal actors to
share leadership. Significant variation in the depth and durability of struc
tural adjustment, in spite of the formulaic tendencies of the IMF, suggests
the importance of local forces in this process (Kahler 1992; Vreeland 2007;
Pop-Eleches 2009). As analysis shifts from understanding policy initiation
to exploring policy implementation, retreat, durability, or amplification, the
role of domestic actors assumes greater importance. Two sets of local actors
have drawn close attention: domestic technocrats in key economic ministries,
and business leaders, particularly those who dominate business associations.
A now-extensive body of literature explores the training and deployment
of domestic technocrats in upper levels of administration and the ways in
which they intersect with international agencies to promote an economic re
form agenda (Edwards 1995; Dominguez 1997; Dezalay and Garth 2002;
Golob 2003). With advanced foreign training in economics, planning, or
other technical fields, these elites entered the government at high levels and
provided a new ideological orientation to guide policy reform. Persuaded
through mainstream academic training and research that economic objec
tives (growth, efficiency, development) are best obtained through open mar
kets, trade liberalization, and models emphasizing comparative advantage,
these proponents used their positions in key government agencies to advance
the cause of market reform through advocacy, persuasion, and intimidation.
These officials were often aligned with and rotated into and out of key think
tanks and universities, which, providing cultural capital and a salaried resting
point between government appointments, assisted with recruitment, social
ization, and legitimation.
Drawing on the cases of Mexico and Canada in the NAFTA negotia
tions, Golob (2003) argues that the combination of exogenous shock and an
internal legitimacy crisis created space for state leaders to redefine traditional
policy frontiers” based on an emerging ideological consensus. She finds that
the trade-policy shift in Mexico and Canada was not due to the rise of new
economic sectors that used pluralistic pressures to advance this cause — not
even in Canada, where political pluralism was more fully established. Instead,
this decision was orchestrated by political leaders based on their own ideo
logical alliances and following an abrupt economic downturn that delegititnized preexisting approaches. This initiative was, in turn, heavily marketed to
the public, where it took root (see also Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Sebastian
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Edwards (1995, 42) observed how key figures such as Pedro Aspe in Mexico
and Domingo Cavallo in Argentina “became the core of technocratic reform
teams that, from within the national bureaucracies, engineered the practical
aspects of the transformation process.”
The pivotal role of this nucleus figures prominently in Waterbury’s (1992)
work on the “change team” and Teichman’s (2001) on the “policy network,”
a broader construct that also includes elected officials, business leaders, think
tanks, and civil society representatives who contributed to neoliberal policy
negotiations. By virtue of frequently shared academic credentials, techno
cratic actors may be portrayed as emissaries of the international financial in
stitutions with which they collaborate. However, in their study of developing
human rights and neoliberal ideologies in Latin America, Dezalay and Garth
(2002) challenged the notion of economic policy migration as simple diffu
sion. Local actors, they found, exercised discretion over what they imported,
and the process of reform domestication was affected by local conditions.
Confusion over the respective roles of internal and external technocrats
is exacerbated by the tendency of some local authorities to ascribe reforms
to the IMF, even when they were locally endorsed. Vreeland (2007, 62-67)
identifies three reasons why domestic actors emphasize the role of the IMF
in the reform process and minimize their own: blame, signaling, and lever
age. Blame allowed domestic authorities to portray the IMF as responsible
for policy reforms, which were sometimes unpopular, thus avoiding respon
sibility and political penalty; signaling allowed local leaders to convey IMF
approval of these reforms, thereby reassuring skittish foreign investment; and
leverage allowed local officials to use IMF symbolism to push through re
forms they desired when they did not have (or want to spend) the political
capital required to secure approval, as when there were many veto players that
could impede reform. In such cases, local technocrats could present a market
reform as an externally imposed requirement when in fact they may have ac
tively pursued the measure.
Studies of market reform that focus on technocratic-elite ideology com
pete with a second body of domestically oriented analyses—those that high
light the material interests at play in the business sector. Implicitly adopting
the structuralist premise that stable states build up and around solid class
coalitions, the latter explore the reshuffling of ties between the dominant
political elite and the new class segments benefiting from market reform.
The new economic model is understood to develop in close consultation with
business elites (or an increasingly important subsector thereof) whose ma
terial interests are advanced by the policy reforms. Whereas a traditional
agroexport-based regime may develop in alliance with agrarian oligarchy, and
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a populist state may be constructed in alliance with domestic industrialists
and corporatist labor organizations, the neoliberal state builds off an alliance
with exporters, financial interests, and perhaps maquila assembly plant labor.
A new equilibrium emerges as (particularly nontraditional) exporters and pri
vate financial interests gain organizational momentum, economic leverage,
and lobbying capacity. Using these resources, economic elites secure a policy
framework and legal environment that allow them to further advance their
interests.
Various studies of market reform highlight the role of domestic business
groups in shaping the trade liberalization agenda (see, for example, Milner
1988; Dur 2010). “Two-level game” analysis (Putnam 1988) of trade negotia
tions examines deal making not simply between representatives of states who
hammer out trade terms (Level I), but also between each government and its
constituents at home (Level II), foremost among them the business lobbies
that will be directly impacted by trade reform. In discussion of ten histori
cal attempts at trade liberalization, Michael Lusztig (2004) identifies various
conditions and government strategies that weaken business opposition and
build business support. Interactions that transform “inflexible rent seekers”
into “flexible rent seekers,” or diminish the power of the former while expand
ing the influence of the latter, allow governing elites to minimize the political
risks associated with eliminating protectionist policies. Detailed case studies
of bargaining and consultative processes surrounding trade liberalization rou
tinely demonstrate the active role of business lobbyists, whose support must
be carefully cultivated (Thacker 2000; IADB, Munk Center for International
Studies, and Inter-American Dialogue 2002; Fairbrother 2007).
Business elites have a wide repertoire of strategies they can deployindividual and collective, formal and informal, associational and electoral—to
advance their interests. The structural dependence of the state on capital gives
the business sector enduring power, which political elites ignore at their peril.
At the same time, the ability of business to exercise this influence depends on
the extent to which they attenuate the differences among themselves through
negotiation, persuasion, intimidation, or exclusion of weaker segments. Al
though historically state-dependent and fragmented in many countries, Latin
America’s business organizations often gained organizational capacity dur
ing market transitions (Durand and Silva 1998). Complex multisectoral peak
associations worked to unify the business voice and amplify its impact.
In Mexico and Chile, strong business associations were found to play a
strategic role in crafting detailed provisions in NAFTA and in the Mercosur
trade agreement (Schneider 2004, 221-230; Teichman 2001). Business rep
resentatives, who were more expert in their industries than government offi
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cials, actively collaborated in these negotiations, advancing recommendations
on tariff schedules and timetables.7 In her study of Chilean free trade negotia
tions, Bull (2008) found that business elites used control over not just capital
but also knowledge to influence the shape of the trade text. The professional
staff of business associations, some of whom rotated between private sector
and government roles, blurred the distinction between public and private and
helped to synchronize business and government positions.
Market reform deals both winning and losing hands to business elites,
leading to fragmentation and organizational reconfiguration. Hierarchies
among business groups with differential access to policy makers lead to policy
reforms that favor particular interests over others. Detailed case studies of pri
vatization in Latin America and Europe challenge conventional arguments
about the ideological or technocratic base of privatization policy, even in neo
liberal showcases like Pinochet’s Chile or Thatcher’s Britain, and frequently
identify ways in which a handful of conglomerates gained privileged access to
policy arenas and shaped particular reforms to their benefit (Schamis 2002;
Manzetti 2009). Heilman (1998) notes the problem of “state capture” in post
communist systems, in which insiders aligned with emerging economic inter
ests to stall economic reforms at an equilibrium point that fell short of full
transition, a strategy that allowed them to extract rents and noncompetitive
benefits. The particular coalitional formation between state elites and eco
nomic elites may direct the reform process to different benchmarks.
State and class coalition analysis draws attention not just to which sectors
are included but also to which are excluded or expelled. Kurtz’s (2004) analysis
of the impact of neoliberal reform on the solidarity structures of rural workers
and peasants in Mexico and Chile suggests ways in which old alliances, once
undermined, eroded quickly. Neoliberal reforms cut into the small farmer re
source base and disrupted peasant organizational capacity, making it easier for
the state to dismiss their claims—an argument that also extends to organized
labor. As traditional state-society links deteriorated and new alliances were
forged, domestic pressures built in favor of particular market reforms.
Political Dynamics and Reform Persistence:
Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Market reform, even when supported by technocratic-norm entrepreneurs
and reconstituted business networks, may still be truncated and temporary.
Since economic reform occurred in tandem with political liberalization in
much of Latin America and Eastern Europe, its persistence would depend
on voter preferences and electoral outcomes. Policy durability is affected by
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t he extent to which candidates and parties come to be identified with market
opening and voters come to endorse their ascent.
Research on the impact of democratic political processes on the entrench
ment of neoliberal reform may be divided between institutional analyses,
which focus on formal electoral outcomes and processes, and work that em
phasizes the shifting patterns of public opinion. Institutional analysis attends
o the formal political processes that advance or constrain policy innovaion, with attention to executive mandates, constitutional veto points, party
coalitions and fragmentation, legislative behavior, formal decision-making
rules, and electoral timing. The margin of victory in presidential elections and
number of institutional checks on presidential power, for example, have been
'ound to affect the pace and extent of economic reform (Haggard and Kauf
man 1995; Pop-Eleches 2009), and the introduction of reform proposals early
m an administration has also been found to improve their approval prospects
(Frye and Mansfield 2004).
Advocates of a “bottom-up” model, in contrast, focus on the extent to
which ordinary citizens come to view market reform as desirable. Empowered
with the opportunity to select from among various candidates, citizens may
endorse or oppose market reform and, in theory, replace leaders whose per
formances disappoint them. According to this body of work, the durability
md progressive advance of a market-based economic model in newly democ: atized countries respond to rising popular preferences for the economic sta
bility and wider consumer choices that these reforms deliver (Weyland 2002;
Armijo and Faucher 2002; Baker 2009). In the end, it is the citizens them
selves who evaluate the success of market reform and choose officeholders
who conform to their preferences. Ongoing market reform, in this model, is
ultimately driven by the positive assessments made by ordinary people.
Whereas some early analysis of market reform in Latin America suggested
that these policies had limited mass support and frequently resulted from
elite imposition or subterfuge (Stokes 2001), other studies identified bases of
popular support, emphasizing public desire for either avoidance of loss or af
firmation of gain. Much of this work builds on the robust finding that linked
high levels of inflation with the introduction of market reform (Remmer
1998; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004). Weyland (2002) explains shifts in public
preferences regarding economic reform in Latin America in terms of “pros
pect theory.” Faced with the prospect of severe economic loss, as under high
inflation, people become less risk averse and more willing to accept changes
whose outcomes are uncertain.
Findings about the power of hyperinflation to elicit support for market
reform are echoed in Armijo and Faucher’s (2002) analysis of forces shap
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ing reform in industrialized Latin American countries. Noting that ten out
of the fourteen presidential elections held between 1983 and 2000 in Argen
tina (pre-crisis), Brazil, Mexico, and Chile were won by pro-market candi
dates, they conclude that the most significant factors explaining sustained
marketization were pro-reform preferences of the general public and politi
cal leaders.
Analyses drawing on survey research and public opinion polls permit
clearer specification of the social base of reform. A large body of research
ties support for market reform to education, finding that those with a higher
level of education tend to be more pro-market (see, for example, Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004). Much of this literature implicitly draws
on a human-capacity hypothesis; better-educated people who have skills and
resources needed to successfully compete in a market economy favor its adop
tion, whereas those with less education recognize their vulnerabilities and are
more resistant to market transformations.
While this literature offers suggestive insights about variations in popu
lar views, it has limited ability to explain why reform support might sweep
through a society, even in countries where the general educational levels are
low. Baker (2009) develops an alternative consumption-based theory of mar
ket reform. Using Latinobarometro data on public opinion in eighteen Latin
American countries, he argues that support for trade liberalization soon
became widespread and multiclass and far surpassed opposition to it. He
concludes that respondents tended to approach trade from a consumption
perspective (consumismo), where they could see a direct link to lower-cost im
ports, rather than from an employment perspective, where the connections
between trade liberalization and job loss were less apparent.
As we will see in the course of this book, debate continues about the
intersection between popular attitudes and market reform. Acceptance of
neoliberal policy was hardly uniform, as ongoing protests and social justice
campaigns attest. Nor did public approval necessarily arise spontaneously. En
dorsement was sometimes accompanied by a hard-selling campaign designed
to achieve that result; public attitudes toward trade reform have been linked
to marketing and manipulation (MacArthur 2000), with resulting volatility.
Even among those who affirm support, internal inconsistencies in market
perceptions have been identified, with privatization eliciting more negative
reactions than trade (Baker 2009; Baker and Greene 2011). Many analysts
have also noted the onset of “reform fatigue” (Lora and Panizza 2003) as ini
tial gains fade and costs became more apparent. When economic conditions
stabilize, the propensity to accept additional reforms may decline, explaining
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why former supporters of reform may subsequently reverse course, even if retor m has brought improvement.
Detailed case studies, while not representative of the universe of reform,
can help us understand subregional variations in reform processes and clarify
particular policy sequences. They also help us tackle the conundrum of why
people might endorse market reforms that seem suboptimal or even adverse
to their interests. What follows is theoretically informed process tracing of
market reform in three Central American countries, moving through initia
tion to deepening and concluding with an assessment of reform persistence
on the eve of the CAFTA negotiations.

Central American Market Reform
Case studies of market reform in Central America allow us to identify the
actors and processes that shaped economic restructuring in the region. Each
country had a distinct historical-institutional profile, and reform processes
varied along key dimensions. Costa Rica entered into reform via a debt crisis,
and policy changes were negotiated piecemeal through a well-institutionalized
democracy. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, in contrast, market transi
tions were driven by economic disarray, institutional weakness, and political
polarization associated with revolutionary struggle and war.
In spite of these differences, structural and geopolitical similarities cre
ated important parallels in the region. These countries were not hermetically
sealed; reform processes in one urged reform in others as cross-regional capi
tal mobility and competition played out across this well-networked landscape.
In that sense, one of the fundamental assumptions of comparative politics—
that each unit is discrete—is not fully operative; the tools of international
political economy, which explore the larger framework within which coun
tries are embedded, provide crucial assistance.
Careful analysis of these neoliberal transition processes permits the se
quencing of reform phases and fuller specification of the actors involved at
each stage. This analysis concludes that reform initiation depended on ex
ternal funders, with USAID playing a leading role, subsequently reinforced
by the IMF and other international lenders. Their catalytic impact required
the cooperation of key state leaders who, during a time of economic crisis,
took guidance from the external donors. The deepening of reform depended on
the active participation of technocratic leaders and the construction of insti
tutional infrastructure (public and private agencies, research centers, think
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tanks) that facilitated recruitment and legitimation of reform ideas. Tech
nocrats received assistance from an expanding network of market-oriented
economic elites, who reshaped business associational life and sought reform
adjustments. Finally, xhz persistence of reform across administrations required
not just business adaptation but public support, as evidenced by electoral vic
tories of pro-market candidates and parties across the period. (Appendix 2
provides an overview of the 1978-2011 presidential election results in these
three countries.)
Although the case study method does not allow generalization beyond
the countries analyzed here, this approach suggests several lines of inquiry
that can inform future research. In what follows, these cases are discussed in
the order that their market reform processes unfolded, beginning with Costa
Rica and ending with Nicaragua.
Market Reform in Costa Rica

During the 1970s, the Costa Rican economy deployed a variant of Latin
America’s reigning import-substituting industrialization model (Hidalgo
2003; Monge and Lizano 1997; Wilson 1998). By comparison with many
other countries in the region, the ownership role of the Costa Rican state
was relatively modest, and activism was concentrated in the social-service
sector through the provision of health and educational services. Nonetheless,
the state did control several core economic activities, the most important
of which were in energy and telecommunications and the banking system,
which had been nationalized in 1948. State-owned companies were managed
by the Costa Rican Development Corporation (CODESA), a holding com
pany formed in 1972, which included fourteen companies at its peak (Edel
man 1999, 64-65; Wilson 1998,101). The state also created a growing number
of autonomous institutions (AIs), with thirty-six new AIs established in the
1960s and fifty added in the 1970s (Edelman 1999, 61). Local industry was
encouraged and protected by a series of tariff and nontariff barriers much like
those prevailing elsewhere in the region.8
Rising petroleum prices in the 1970s hit the economy hard, but easy for
eign borrowing allowed leaders to postpone adjustments. By 1980, the bud
get deficit reached 8% of GDP (IMF 1998,16). External debt stocks, already
59% of gross national income (GNI) in 1980, rose to 165% in 1982? In 1983,
the per capita debt was the second-highest in Latin America (Korten 1997,
34). The Carazo administration (1978-1982), facing the collapse of the Cen
tral American Common Market (CACM), which had absorbed 80% of Costa
Rica’s manufactured exports, declared a debt moratorium and defaulted in
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July 1981. The inflation rate soared to 90% the following year.10 As economic
conditions deteriorated, the government signed a stabilization agreement
with the IMF, but the country immediately fell out of compliance (Newton
et al. 1988).
During the Luis Alberto Monge administration (1982—1986), special U.S.
foreign policy interests in the region brought increased attention and finan
cial flows. The Reagan administration’s geopolitical concern about “commu
nist” expansion fueled hostility to the newly installed Sandinista government
in neighboring Nicaragua, which was perceived as a Soviet ally and national
security threat. With administration officials eager to stabilize Costa Rica and
showcase a successful democratic market alternative in the region, U.S. eco
nomic assistance to Costa Rica more than tripled between 1981 and 1982, and
then quadrupled to $214 million in 1983 (see table 1.2). U.S. aid to Costa Rica
averaged 4% of GDP for the critical 1983-1987 market-transition period.
As controversy over Central America policy flared in the United States,
a special bipartisan commission chaired by former secretary of state Henry
Kissinger proposed a five-year, $1.2 billion annual aid program for the re
gion. Labeled “the Sandinista windfall” in a 1998 USAID retrospective on
the Costa Rica aid program, real average annual USAID funding for Costa
Rica in 1982-1995 increased sixfold over the 1973-1981 levels (Fox 1998,17).
This assistance proved a catalyst to a market reform process that carried across
subsequent administrations. In all, U.S. economic aid to Costa Rica totaled
over $1.4 billion between 1982 and 1995 (see table 1.2).
Official development assistance, over 90% of which came from the United
States, equaled 25% of general government spending in 1983-1985 (Sauma
and Trejos 1999, 353). U.S. funds were used for balance of payments sup
port, covering the dollar costs of private sector imports, with the importers’
local currency payments used to support a series of mutually agreed upon re
form projects. According to USAID evaluations and reports, priorities in
cluded CODESA enterprise divestiture, promotion of nontraditional exports,
and the construction of a network of new public and quasi-private institu
tions that would become internal advocates for further market transition (Fox
1998; Newton et al. 1988).
The new institutional framework included the Costa Rican Investment
Promotion Agency (CINDE) and the Foreign Trade Ministry (COMEX).
CINDE, created in 1983, provided a convergence space for pro-reform policy
elites to coordinate recommendations with representatives from domestic and
multinational firms. This agency prepared proposals promoting foreign in
vestment and exports and lobbied elected officials to secure passage. Dur
ing its first five years of operation, CINDE was entirely funded by USAID,

Table 1.2. U.S. economic assistance, 1980-2003
Aid to
Costa

% of

Aid to El

Rica

Costa

Salvador

%0f

Nicaragua

Aid to
%of

(current

Rican

(current

Salvadoran

(current

Nicaraguan

Year

US$)

GDP

US$)

GDP

US$)

GDP

1980

15.9

0.3

58.3

1.6

38.7

1.8

1981

15.2

0.6

113.9

3.3

59.9

2.4

1982

51.8

2.0

182.2

5.4

6.3

0.3

1983

214.1

5.4

245.5

7.0

0.0

0.0

1984

169.8

3.7

215.9

5.9

0.1

0.0

1985

220.1

4.6

434.0

11.4

0.0

0.0

1986

162.7

3.0

322.6

8.6

0.0

0.0

1987

181.2

3.1

462.9

11.7

0.0

0.0

1988

120.6

2.0

314.2

7.5

0.4

0.0

1989

122.3

1.8

307.3

7.0

3.9

0.4

224.5

22.2

1990

95.5

1.3

246.9

5.1

1991

45.2

0.6

228.0

4.3

219.4

14.7

1992

27.0

0.3

274.0

4.6

76.6

4.3

1993

27.8

0.3

215.1

3.1

152.5

8.7

1994

12.2

0.1

57.0

0.7

95.6

3.2

1995

6.3

0.1

63.3

0.7

32.7

1.0

1996

2.2

0.0

78.5

0.8

27.7

0.8

1997

0.4

0.0

31.8

0.3

28.1

0.8

1998

1.2

0.0

42.5

0.4

56.5

1.6

1999

2.3

0.0

60.2

0.5

100.0

2.7

2000

2.1

0.0

44.4

0.3

33.9

0.9

2001

3.1

0.0

132.3

1.0

66.4

1.6

2002

3.0

0.0

143.5

1.0

53.6

1.3

2003

4.7

0.0

57.9

0.4

65.8

1.6

Source: USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov,
accessed July 11,2011.
Note: Calculations based on GDP (current US$) from World Bank, World Development Indica
tors (WB/WDI), http://databank.worldbank.org, accessed July 11,2011.
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vhich provided grants, between 1983 and 1994, totaling $70 million (Robin
son 2003, 139).11 USAID also supported the creation of COMEX, which

emerged from modest beginnings as a program within the president’s office
co form a separate trade ministry with a full professional staff.
International financial institutions soon returned to sign a series of agree
ments that pulled the Costa Rican economy in a market direction. The IMF
provided six loans for Costa Rica between 1985 and 1995, which together
contained thirty-four performance criteria and fifty-six total conditions (Co
pelovitch 2010, 321). These loans were coordinated with the World Bank and
he Paris Club (bilateral lenders) through a system of cross-conditionality,
m which approval of one became a condition for approval by others.12 Three
structural adjustment programs (PAE) developed between 1985 and 1995
provided clear financial and normative incentives to local policy makers to
redirect the economy along market lines.
The first agreement, PAE I, signed by the Monge administration with the
‘ Vorld Bank in 1985, entailed a commitment to launch privatization and re
duce state spending. Following a drop in USAID funding during the Arias
administration (1986-1990), PAE II was signed with the World Bank in 1988
ior $200 million to strengthen the state’s fiscal capacity; cut state subsidies for
uublic services, agricultural price supports, the petroleum refinery, and rail
roads; and promote nontraditional exports while further reducing trade bar
kers. Additional debt relief came under the Bush administration’s 1989 Brady
Plan, with a Paris Club arrangement allowing Costa Rica to buy back 64%
Tits $1.6 billion external debt at a discounted rate of 16 cents on the dollar
Booth 1998,164). Consolidating this phase of trade reform, Costa Rica be
came a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
:990.
PAE III, a $150 million loan package from the World Bank and the IMF,
vvas negotiated in 1994-1995 during the Figueres Olsen administration
1994-1998). This agreement pushed for deeper reforms and proved more
conflictual (Weisleder 2004, xxiii-xxv). Lacking the party majority in the
egislature that was held by his National Liberation Party (PLN) predeces
sors, Monge and Arias, and by Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) presi
dent Calderon (1990-1994), Figueres Olsen found it more difficult to secure
legislative support. With IMF and IDB agreements calling for a sharp cut in
public sector jobs and major tax increases, this negotiation triggered a month
long teachers’ strike in 1995 and violent protests in Limon in 1996 (Booth
1998,165).
Although the legislature ultimately approved the loan, the World Bank
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canceled its part of the package when the government proved unable to reach
an agreement with the IMF. The IDB came through in 1995 with a series of
loans totaling $250 million after an IMF agreement was reached (Edelman
1999, 81). With the economic crisis waning and regional politics normalizing
in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Costa Rica moved out of the phase of “tutored
reform” under international management (Sojo 2004), and the market reform
process slowed, as the structural reform index in table 1.1 suggests.
Reform repeatedly elicited resistance, both in the legislature and on the
streets, and the results did not converge with an orthodox neoliberal model
The state still played an important role in the national economy, and the
Costa Rica variant of neoliberal reform retained several heterodox features,
including a substantial state-run social service sector (Seligson and Martinez
2010). Even after the gradual opening to private competition, state banks
continued to dominate the banking sector. The state also controlled sugar
commercialization, petroleum imports, insurance, telecommunications, and
energy distribution. Economic “distortions” connected to the ISI model were
temporarily replaced by new ones associated with export promotion to ease
the transition.13
Nonetheless, Costa Rica had launched a significant process of structural
reform. The Wall Street /tfz/rzztf//Heritage Foundation Index for Economic
Freedom, which includes a corruption indicator, placed Costa Rica among
the regional leaders in market liberalization (www.heritage.org/index/expl
ore). With an overall score of 67 in 2003 (based largely on its high fiscal and
trade freedom and low corruption scores), Costa Rica was ranked fifth in
Latin America, behind Chile (76), El Salvador (71.5), Uruguay (69.8), and
Panama (68.4).
New economic space was created under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the
Reagan administration’s unilateral U.S. market opening for exporters from
the region. Established to counter revolutionary agitation and deepen mar
ket connections, the CBI eased access to the U.S. market for nontraditional
exporters in Central America. Costa Rica responded strongly, and nontraditional agricultural and industrial exports increased quickly. Costa Rica’s export processing zone (EPZ) regime provided investors with 100% tax ex
emption for eight years and 50% for the following four (PNUD 2003, 133).
From 56 companies producing 6.5% of exports in 1990, the country’s EPZs
expanded to 229 businesses, generating over 47% of exports in 2001 (PNUD
2003,129).
External actors played a critical role in advancing this market reform, with
USAID, for geopolitical reasons, taking the lead and working in close col
laboration with the IMF and the World Bank. But restructuring could ad
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vance only with the active cooperation of domestic economic policy makers.
A new team of technocrats, appointed by President Monge to fill the Cen
tral Bank presidency and the major economic ministerial positions in 1984,
provided local management for the policy shift. Initially appointed to in
crease the confidence of foreign lenders during a period of economic difficulty
(Church and Loria-Chaves 2004, 8), this cohort, which centered on the new
Central Bank president, Eduardo Lizano Fait, expanded into an array of offi
cial roles.14 Lizano served as Central Bank president in parts of four admin
istrations (Monge, Arias, Rodriguez, and Pacheco) between 1984 and 2002,
and he worked closely with the IMF and the IDB, subsequently serving as an
IMF governor in 2000-2001. The “chief architect and lobbyist” for liberal
ization measures (Nelson 1990, 187), Lizano collaborated with like-minded
economists to change the dominant economic ideas.15
According to Lizano, the pretransition Costa Rican economy was riddled
by distortions and rent-seeking practices. At a USAID-funded conference
hosted by Costa Rica in June 1991 and attended by prominent neoliberal
theoreticians and practitioners from the United States, Chile, Mexico, and
Costa Rica, Lizano concluded the following (1992, 173): “For several de
cades, the Costa Rican economy was characterized by the growing creation of
rents that benefited specific groups of producers and certain labor groups. This
collection of measures was embodied in laws, regulations, norms, and provi
sions of a widely varying nature, such as subsidies, exonerations, controls and
prohibitions. All of this made the Costa Rican economy highly distorted.”
Recommending a strict free market approach, including “severe penalty” for
entrepreneurs who failed to adapt, Lizano concluded, “If there is not enough
competition, entrepreneurs get drowsy. Only competition obligates them to
sleep with their eyes open” (176).
Lizano further argued that economic freedom was integral to the cause of
liberty in much the same way as political freedom, and that each depended
on the other. This forceful pro-market outlook came to reign in various Costa
Rican think tanks and research centers, particularly those like CINDE and
the Academia de Centroamerica, which had been established with USAID
funding.16 These centers gave resident economists consulting opportunities
and a “resting point” between stints of government or quasi-public service
(Church and Loria-Chaves 2004; Blanco Lizano 2010,166-171).
With Eduardo Lizano as president, the Academia de Centroamerica
played a pivotal role generating and diffusing market professionalism. It be
came a “concept center” for market-norm entrepreneurship, deliberately fo
cused on creating an epistemic community and preparing a network of emerg
ing economists for graduate work in the United States and Chile (Lizano
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2005). The Academia’s educational outreach included monthly information
sessions for “junior economists” who wanted to engage with peers and con
tinue their education; journalists covering business and financial news; and
legislative staff members seeking to deepen their understanding of economic
affairs. It awarded cash prizes to junior economists participating in essay com
petitions and to journalists for outstanding coverage of economic news. It
also set up virtual help centers for journalists and clergy members who had
inquiries about economic issues. These programs allowed a network of clas
sically trained economists to disseminate a market-friendly orientation to
economic issues and to reach a broad segment of opinion makers in Costa
Rican society. Following the leveraging pattern identified by Vreeland (2007,
62-67), local technocrats also urged external funders to withhold resources
in order to extract reforms and, well-positioned to understand the pressure
points and timing of domestic political deliberations, helped identify strategic
moments at which to act (Wilson 1998).
External actors collaborated with domestic technocrats to advance the new
model, but, as structuralist analysis suggests, the durability and deepening of
market reform would depend on the way it resonated with the local class
structures. As industrialists producing for a local and/or Central American
market were displaced by the new emphasis on nontraditional products for a
global market, the privileged position of that historically favored class frag
ment eroded. An innovative business subsector would have to develop quickly
around the new economic model, or its durability would be jeopardized.
An emerging coalition of new exporters and financial interests helped to
consolidate the transition, broadening elite support for market reform. The
change was facilitated by its steady but gradual nature and by the availability
of transition support, which gave exporters time to shift to new products or
expand markets into new terrain. Over the course of twenty years, some agri
cultural producers, for example, were able to reconfigure their crop allocations
or adjust their production and shipping practices to gain entry into nontradi
tional markets.17 Some local firms entered joint ventures or licensing agree
ments with transnational corporations and adapted operations accordingly.
In his study of the local stock market and firm-level growth, Diego
Sanchez-Ancochea (2005, 697-704) identified three major changes in the
Costa Rican business sector during the 1980s and 1990s: the concentration
of capital in the largest domestic firms; expansion into the Central American
and Mexican markets; and increasing ties with foreign investors and trans
national corporations. The opening to private banking created new oppor
tunities for local entrepreneurs (Robles Rivera 2010, 105) and attracted re
gional and international financial investors, with Nicaraguan and Salvadoran
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banks among the ten largest private banks in Costa Rica in 2003 (SanchezAncochea 2005, 703).
Economic groups began to organize politically, ultimately creating an
activist network of business associations. Several of the established business
chambers initially resisted market reform, concerned about the loss of pro
tection. Pro-market technocrats engaged in “a little social engineering” and
worked with emerging exporters and bankers to create a new set of specialized
business chambers (Lizano 2005; see also Lizano 1999, 170-172). Gradu
ally, traditional chambers like the Costa Rican Chamber of Industry (CICR)
underwent major internal changes, with a new emphasis on competitiveness
and quality controls as the industrial sector strengthened its export capabili
ties. The business peak association,18 the Costa Rican Union of Private Sec
tor Chambers and Associations (UCCAEP), expanded to include 43 cham
bers by 2005, many in new economic sectors. Membership in the American
Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica (AMCHAM-Costa Rica) mush
roomed to 400 Costa Rican and U.S. companies in 2005, reportedly repre
senting 80% of U.S. foreign investment (Denton, July 8, 2005).
As the new business networks emerged, labor and the peasant sector suf
fered reversals. Organized labor in Costa Rica was concentrated in the public
sector, and the contraction of the state in the 1980s and 1990s cut into the
unionized workforce. By 2000, organized labor represented only 10% of the
workforce, down from 15% in 1995 (PEN 2001, 209). New industrial jobs,
many of which were located in the EPZs, generally were organized in soli
darity associations, not unions, with limited capacity to press sectoral de
mands (Mosley 2008). More traditional business elites, particularly those in
declining sectors, approached reform with skepticism (Colburn and Sanchez
2000, 53-67) but were losing the ability to influence the private sector politi
cal voice.
In the rural sector, the organizational capacity of small and medium-sized
agricultural producers (and even large ones in the less successful parts of the
economy) eroded over time. As the traditional agricultural economy declined,
farmers responded with a surge of protests, and protective tariffs stabilized
in the agricultural sector after 2000.19 Many small producers, however, failed
to flourish in a more competitive environment. Some peasant organizations
became shells almost overnight, although led by feisty leaders whose passion
ate commitment and internal struggles led them to invent and reinvent their
movements (Edelman 1999, 2008). As the portion of the population em
ployed in agriculture continued its steady fall and the regime became more
deeply committed to neoliberal practices, ongoing protection of the agricul
tural sector came under question.20
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The economic and organizational consolidation of new business sectors in
banking, EPZ, tourism, and nontraditional exports, combined with the ero
sion of public sector unions and small farmers associations, provided sectoral
grounding for the economic policy shift. But in an open political system, like
that found in Costa Rica, citizens and voters have the final say. Public support
for economic restructuring (as opposed to stabilization) may be limited at the
outset due to transition costs and uncertainties. Unless voters acquiesce to on
going change, the turnover of elected officials could soon detain transition. In
Costa Rica, parties and officials associated with restructuring repeatedly won
reelection or were replaced by others that shared this commitment. Although
weak party discipline meant that presidents could not assume uniform sup
port from their party’s legislative bench or from the national party leadership,
they strengthened their hold on the government through an increasing use of
executive decrees and regulations.21
The historically dominant PLN enjoyed two additional circumstances in
the 1980s that helped it launch an economic transition. For the first time,
the party won two terms in a row with an outright majority of the vote. The
victory margins, with Monge s 58.8% of the vote in 1982, followed by Arias’
52.3% in 1986, were historically unprecedented (Booth 1998, 67); previously,
party victories had tended to rotate between parties and coalitions. Second,
although the PLN lost the elections in 1990, 1998, and 2002, the CenterRight PUSC also endorsed the restructuring agenda, and a new elite consen
sus emerged around what Cornick and Trejos (2009,155) called “the sensible
center.” Indeed, the overlap in PLN and PUSC positions on economic reform
was such that critics began using the “PLUSC” label to suggest that these
parties had merged.22
Electoral outcomes are based on many factors, only some of which are re
lated to candidate and party policy positions; assumptions about public pref
erences for particular economic models based simply on election results may
be questioned. In fact, PLN leaders initially obfuscated the party’s deepening
embrace of the market, as a segment of the leadership began to redefine the
party’s economic orientation (Wilson 1999). Over time, however, the PLN
position of economic globalization and domestic reform became clearer, and
voters still returned its leaders to power.
Taken together with information derived from public opinion polls, these
electoral results are suggestive. Further evidence of public support for mar
ket reform during this juncture emerges from the annual eighteen-country
Latinobarometro polls. Poll results are sometimes volatile and contradictory,
but they can also capture changing preferences. The present study focuses on
one broad question and follows the responses across time and cross-nationally.
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Asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, “The market
economy is best for the country,” three-fourths (76%) of respondents in Costa
Rica answered affirmatively (strongly agree or agree) in 1998. After fifteen
years of accumulated reform, public acceptance of a market economy was
strong in Costa Rica, topping the Latin America average of 66% by ten per
centage points at that time (Latinobarometro 2009, 91).
Adjustment had caused some pain, and growth had slowed in 1981-1989
to an average annual 2.4%. But in the 1990s, growth resumed, averaging 4.7%
in 1990-1997 and an even stronger 4.8% in 1998-2003 (ECLAC, 2010d, 53).
New sectors had emerged, as seen with the rapid growth of tourism and the
free trade zones, capped by the 1996 INTEL announcement of a $300 million
high-tech investment in Costa Rica. The country’s two major political parties
had converged around a new model, which had trimmed the state sector and
deepened Costa Rica’s integration into the global market. And public accep
tance of the shift, while neither uniform nor unconditional, as we shall see,
was widespread.
Market Reform in El Salvador

As Costa Rica underwent debt crisis and structural reform, El Salvador was
descending into civil war. Before the peace accord was signed in 1992, an
estimated 75,000 people would die (1.8% of the population) (Wood 2003, 8).
Conflict between the U.S.-supported government and the FMLN set off a
national-security alarm for the Reagan administration. In an effort to under
cut a revolutionary movement and stop “communist” expansion, the U.S. gov
ernment funneled massive military and economic assistance to El Salvador in
the 1980s. Focusing just on economic aid, U.S. assistance rose quickly from
$58.3 million in 1980 to peak at $462.9 million in 1987 and remained high
until after the war concluded (see table 1.2). Total economic assistance to El
Salvador in 1980-1993 topped $3.6 billion. Annual U.S. economic assistance
averaged 6.5% of El Salvador’s GDP for the nine-year period between 1981
and 1993, and exceeded 11% of GDP in 1985 and 1987. In both absolute and
relative terms, U.S. economic assistance began earlier, peaked higher, and
continued longer in El Salvador than in any other Central American country.
During the early years, under the leadership of Christian Democrat Jose
Napoleon Duarte, who served as a member of the reformist civilian-military
junta (1980-1982) and president (1984-1989), the Salvadoran government
pursued several state-centered structural reforms intended to weaken the tra
ditional agroexport elite (Johnson 1998; Segovia 2002,10-14). With techni
cal and financial assistance from the United States, the government initiated
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agrarian reform, introduced state control of coffee and sugar exports, anc
nationalized the banking system. This “communitarian” interlude, in which
the government sought to increase state autonomy from traditional elites ano
undercut FMLN recruitment, won few adherents in this increasingly polar
ized country.
Duarte was soon pushed to reverse course by USAID, his principal ally and
financial backer. Economic stabilization and reactivation emerged as central
objectives when the war reached a plateau after 1985 (Rosa 1993; Segovia
2002, 95-104). The United States conditioned aid on a currency devaluation
designed to stimulate exports, leading to confrontation and eventual conces
sion by the Duarte government. A stabilization plan was approved in 1986,
followed by a 1987 program to develop nontraditional exports. Duarte, how
ever, discontinued debt-service payments in the first part of 1989 as war re
surged, and the World Bank and the IDB suspended loan outlays (Segovia,
2002, 32, n43).
Duarte’s faltering attempts to slow or resist market reforms were swept
aside with the legislative (1988) and presidential (1989) victory of the rightwing ARENA party. From its early association with anticommunist death
squads, ARENA had emerged as a pro-business party that recruited leaders
from among the economic elite. Its economic reform proposals were heavily
guided by research and policy papers crafted by the Salvadoran Social and
Economic Development Foundation (FUSADES), a Salvadoran think tank.
Created in 1983, FUSADES quickly became a major recipient of USAID
funding. As in Costa Rica, USAID helped to build the institutional infra
structure that would serve to advance market reform over time. Given financ
ing of over $150 million between 1984 and 1993 (Robinson 2003, 90), FU
SADES provided technical and ideological support for a slate of market
reforms. Following the 1989 election of ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani (1989-1994), seventeen FUSADES leaders swept into economic minis
tries, most in high-level positions (Segovia 2002, 30).23 Several had headed
major business associations (Johnson 1998,143), blending business and policy
credentials.
In addition to its role as a recruiting ground for ARENA economic minis
tries, FUSADES’ Economic and Social Studies Department (DEES) played
the lead role in policy development. With support from USAID, DEES
tapped into an emerging pool of internationally trained economists and con
tracted high-profile economic consultants to prepare the Cristiani govern
ment program, Hacia una economia de mercado en El Salvador: Bases para una
nueva estrategia de desarrollo economico y social (1989-1994). Prominent neolib
eral economist Arnold Harberger played a critical technical and symbolic role
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in preparing the document (Vidal 2010, 93-97) and remained a long-term
FUSADES affiliate.24
Over time, FUSADES developed greater internal technical expertise, and
it contributed to economic plans for each of the three successive ARENA ad
ministrations (FUSADES, Carta Informativa, April 2004). DEES recom
mendations emphasized privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and
capital mobility. Exports were understood to drive growth in the global econ
omy. Attention centered on competitiveness, and proposals drew on diag
noses of problems provided by detailed surveys of the business sector.
As the war reached a stalemate and restructuring began, El Salvador
entered into a series of discussions with the IMF. Between 1990 and 1998,
the government signed six standby loan agreements, with thirty-four per
formance criteria (Copelovitch 2010, 323). Unlike Costa Rica, where debt
crisis and inflation were drivers for IMF engagement, El Salvador’s external
debt stock was a relatively modest 49% of GNI, and the consumer price in
crease was moderate and falling in 1990.25 Agreements made after 1990 with
the IMF focused less on stabilization and more on increasing international
recognition for the reform effort and quelling dissatisfaction among dissent
ing elites (Segovia 2002).
Bank privatization and new export-promotion legislation were approved
in 1990, followed by liberalization of prices, the exchange rate, charges for
public services, and tariffs. Additional measures (Central Bank autonomy,
creation of a stock market, and elimination of export taxes) were designed to
attract foreign investment (Segovia 2002, 32, 37-40). As table 1.1 indicates,
these market reforms boosted El Salvador’s structural reform scores, with
sharp increases in 1993 and 1998.
The historic peace process, which ended the civil war in 1992, absorbed
the FMLN into the political system but did not derail the marketization
agenda. Although Cristiani ally and FUSADES founding member Roberto
Murray Meza failed to get the ARENA presidential nomination for the 1994
election, the essential neoliberal framework was not contested. ARENA can
didate Armando Calderon Sol’s (1994-1999) election brought a push for
additional privatization (of telecommunications and electricity). Economic
leadership was conferred on Enrique Hinds, a former World Bank official and
free market theoretician known for his advocacy of dollarization (see Hinds
2006; Steil and Hinds 2009). Official dollarization was achieved under Fran
cisco Flores (1999-2004), in the third ARENA administration. In spite of
controversy about this policy, Flores announced the dollarization decision
on November 22, 2000, and quickly pushed it through a compliant legisla
ture. Implementation began only weeks later, on January 1, 2001 (Towers and
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Borzutzky 2004). El Salvador’s national currency, the colon, soon in effect
disappeared.
Export promotion, advanced with USAID support since 1984, was facili
tated by the Ley de Reactivacion de las Exportaciones (1990) and deepened
at the end of the decade with laws encouraging increased foreign investment
(the 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion and Guarantee Law, 1998 Free
Trade Zones Law, and 1999 Investment Law). The value of nontraditional
exports surpassed that of traditional ones in 1991, a gap that widened over
the decade. Coffee export value, already down to 5.4% of GDP in 1990, fell to
0.7% of GDP in 2002 (Acevedo 2004, 351). The maquila sector, which pro
vided investors a twenty-year tax exemption (PNUD 2003,133), rose quickly
from modest beginnings to become a major anchor of the new economy
Whereas maquila exports totaled $81 million in 1990 (1.7% of GNP), they
increased to $1.76 billion (12.3% of GDP) in 2002 (Acevedo 2004,351).26 By
2001, 86,000 Salvadoran workers were employed in 339 enterprises in the ex
port processing zones (PNUD, 2003,129).
As elsewhere, neoliberal policy reform could hardly be sustained unless
business activities reconfigured around the new model. The war era had bro
ken the power of the traditional coffee elite, facilitating a shift in economic
structure. Although land in the historically dominant coffee sector remained
largely unaffected by the agrarian reform,27 agroexport production and distri
bution processes were disrupted by fighting and labor displacement in the war
zones. Production losses, capital flight, and self-exile hurt the coffee sector,
and innovative Salvadoran agroexporters searched for new profits outside of
agriculture. Fissures opened in the 1980s between the traditional agroexport
elite and those shifting to an emerging industrial-financial sector, strength
ening the latter and laying a groundwork for a change in the economic model
in the 1990s (Paige 1998; Madrid 2009).
The 1990 bank privatization and 1992 peace process created opportuni
ties for reformulated sectors of the Salvadoran elite to acquire interests in
finance, commerce, construction, and real estate—areas that anchored a series
of new economic groups. As suppliers and importers and through joint ven
tures, businesses built links to transnational corporations. Segovia (2005)
identified eight postwar corporate clusters in El Salvador, each with shares
in multiple local and regional businesses (see also Madrid 2009). Two Salva
doran business groups were anchored in the expanding banking sector (Banco
Agricola and Cuscatlan), whereas others extended from their base in regional
airline transportation (Taca), large hotel and mall development (Poma), and
retail sales, storage, and real estate (Siman). Market opportunities throughout
Central America facilitated cross-regional investment, and networked eco
nomic groups began to redefine regional economic relations.28
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Salvadoran business elites developed various mechanisms that strength
ened their access to political power. As elsewhere in the region, elites used
their business associations as a mechanism to advance collective interests. El
Salvador’s traditional business peak association, the National Private Enter
prise Association (Asociacion Nacional de la Empresa Privada or ANEP),
founded in 1966, expanded to include almost 40 chambers in the late 1990s
(Johnson 1998, 139). As in Costa Rica, a chamber was created specifically
to strengthen the organizational voice of the new export sector. Originally
set up as a committee within the Association of Salvadoran Industry (ASI),
the Corporation of Salvadoran Exporters (COEXPORT) split off to form a
separate chamber with funding from USAID (Orellana Merlos 2005, fn. 5).
As ANEP expanded, chambers were added for nontraditional exporters,
banking, real estate, construction, insurance and AMCHAM-E1 Salvador,
which represented firms with U.S. investments or markets. These networks
allowed association leaders to link internally with like-minded others and
externally with dominant institutions. Nine of thirteen members of ASI’s
1990-1991 board of directors, for example, also served on FUSADES execu
tive committees (Johnson 1998,135).
In addition to these conventional mechanisms of interest representation,
the Salvadoran business sector had direct access to state leaders through
ARENA. Unlike many business elites, who steer away from visible parti
san alliances for pragmatic reasons, the Salvadoran elite cultivated strong
party ties. Three of four ARENA presidents (Cristiani, Calderon Sol, and
Saca) hailed from the business elite, as did prominent members of the party’s
governing board. A business identity percolated through the party structure
and helped to define it. According to official biographical profiles reviewed
by Koivumaeki (2010, 91-92), 26% of ARENA deputies in the 2006-2009
legislative assembly self-identified as businessmen or businesswomen, and
biographies of 40% of ARENA 2009-2012 mayoral candidates referred to
their status as business owners. This close connection with the business sec
tor provided ARENA with valuable strategic resources. Through financial
contributions, public opinion leadership, and direct service as candidates,
party leaders, and advisers, business elites played a critical role in the party’s
twenty-year history of electoral victory (Koivumaeki 2010).
In the end, of course, electoral outcomes depend not simply on the views
of business elites but on the voters. Pro-market ARENA presidential candi
dates won four consecutive elections between 1989 and 2009, three of them
in the first round of balloting (1989, 1999, and 2004). In conjunction with
the PCN, a traditional, clientelistic party, ARENA also controlled the legis
lative vote.29 The FMLN, which offered an alternative approach, remained a
minority party.
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ARENA’S repeated victories suggest broad acceptance of market reform in
El Salvador during this period. As in Costa Rica, electoral results affirming
pro-market parties provide but one indicator of public approval; public opin
ion polls provide a second. Although not all policies won support (dollariza
tion was particularly unpopular [IUDOP 2004, 85]), the market system in
general was widely endorsed. When asked in the Latinobarometro poll about
their views on the statement, “The market economy is best for the country,”
78% of Salvadorans indicated either strong agreement or agreement in 1998, a
support level that surpassed even the high levels found in Costa Rica (Latino
barometro 2009, 91).
Factors contributing to this outcome are undoubtedly complex. Desire to
leave behind the trauma of civil war, combined with deep dependence on
U.S. government aid and migration agreements, encouraged this view. Steady
pro-market messaging in the conservative mainstream media probably con
tributed, as did the portrayal of FMLN opponents as violent ideologues bent
on destruction. In addition, general economic improvements encouraged a
favorable assessment. Whereas average annual GDP growth during the war
years 1981-1989 had been -0.9%, it increased to 5.2% as the war concluded
in 1990-1997 (ECLAC, 2010d, 53). Although the growth rate declined to
an average annual 2.6% in 1998-2003, most Salvadorans remained optimistic
about the positive potential of this economic arrangement at that time.
Market Reform in Nicaragua

Market reform in Nicaragua advanced quickly following the 1990 electoral
defeat of FSLN candidate and sitting president Daniel Ortega. The new
president, Violeta Chamorro (1990-1996), who emerged at the helm of the
14-party UNO coalition, brought an end to the turbulent Sandinista decade
and shifted the country toward a market system. Over the next three admin
istrations, market-friendly policies unfolded.
In the previous decade, the Sandinista Revolution (1979-1990) had estab
lished a mixed economy that prioritized state-centered accumulation. Fol
lowing the 1979 ouster of Anastasio Somoza, the revolutionary government
seized the assets of the Somoza family and its allies, thus acquiring extensive
agricultural holdings and a large network of industrial and commercial ac
tivities. Private banks collapsed during the insurrection, and were replaced
by state-owned banks. The new banking system modified credit distribution
practices, improving access for small producers and domestic market crops,
although in a financially unsustainable way. The government quickly assumed
monopoly control over the export of major commodities, eliminating private
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Lading firms, and imposed increasingly complex regulations on trade and
•omestic transactions. As the decade wore on, other expropriations followed.
y the end of this era, about 30% of GDP was controlled by the state sec
tor, and the private sector faced extensive regulation (Spalding 1987; Conroy
990; Martinez Cuenca 1990; Sola Montserrat 2007).
Limited state capacity, deepening internal polarization, and military presare prevented the Sandinista government from consolidating these reforms.
Conflict with the Reagan administration fueled the “contra” war, which the
•J.S. sponsored and financed. By 1987, the costs of the war absorbed 62%
C the Nicaraguan government budget and 30% of GDP; the inflation rate
oared, topping 33,000% in 1988 (Conroy 1990, 16; Rodriguez Alas 2002,
8). Government efforts to stabilize the economy had only modest results,
:nd living standards tumbled. With the economy contracting and the war
ill not fully resolved, Nicaraguan voters chose a change of course in 1990.
The George H. W. Bush administration (1988-1992) funded Chamorro’s
campaign and greeted her victory with a promise of assistance. During the
ransition period preceding her inauguration, representatives from USAID
nd the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, State, Treasury, and Commerce
emulated a $300 million assistance plan designed to stabilize the country
nd advance its economic recovery (GAO 1992, 9). Congress approved the
ending in the 1990 Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, and
’ SAID reassigned 1991 allocations to meet additional needs in Nicaragua.
: s in Costa Rica and El Salvador, U.S. support came largely in cash transfers
hat financed “non-luxury” imports from the U.S. and Central America, supnrting a consumer boost during the Chamorro government’s early years. The
•S. also provided $75 million to help clear the arrears on Nicaragua’s debts
to the World Bank (unpaid since 1984) and the IDB (unpaid since 1987), to
How renewed lending from these organizations and the IME
U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua, which had been negligible from
?383 through 1989, jumped to a total of $443.9 million in 1990 and 1991
Lnd $1 billion across the decade (see table 1.2). U.S. aid equaled a remarkable
22.2% of Nicaragua’s GDP in 1990 and 14.7% the following year. The 1992
GAO report on U.S. assistance provides a list of conditions governing the aid,
vvhich included reducing government spending, re-establishing private banks,
re-licensing private trading companies, privatization of state-owned enter
prises, and contracting the size of the government workforce (GAO 1992,16).
Nine private banks quickly set up shop, and by 1995 they held over half
°f all bank deposits (World Bank 1995, 26). State trade monopolies were
eliminated in 1991-1992, and import tariffs were unilaterally reduced. Of the
351 state-owned firms slated for divestiture, the government had privatized,
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liquidated, or transferred 233 by 1992. The central government Occupatior al
Conversion Program provided a generous severance package (averaging 20
months of salary) to those state workers who were willing to forfeit their jobs.
U.S. geopolitical concerns played the central role inUSAIDs rapid inter
vention. This economic assistance was sometimes held hostage to political ob
jectives, as the U.S. government moved to “desandinize” the Nicaraguan state.
North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms secured a partial aid suspension in 1992,
for example, over Chamorro’s failure to remove FSLN army chief Humberto
Ortega, brother to the defeated president. USAID assistance to Nicaragua
declined sharply after 1994 (see table 1.2), replaced by rising assistance from
multilateral lenders. In spite of the drop off in U.S. aid, total official develop
ment assistance from all bilateral and multilateral sources equaled $3.8 billion
in 1990-1996, an annual average of 30% of GDP at that time (Sola Montser
rat 2007,123).
Sustained, single-minded attention to economic reform was provided by
the IMF, which renewed lending to Nicaragua in 1991 following massive de
valuation and a series of policy agreements (Lacayo Oyanguren 2005, 201202, 232-233, 239-245). Between 1994 and 2002, three multiyear structural
adjustment loans were signed with the IMF. For the ten years between 2002
and 2012, Nicaragua did not pass more than 15 months at a stretch without
an IMF lending agreement in place.
In collaboration with the World Bank and with support from USAID, the
IMF provided close supervision of Nicaraguan economic performance. Ac
cording to a Government of Nicaragua (2000,14) report on structural reforms
undertaken in the 1990s, public sector employment (including the armed
forces) dropped from 285,000 to 89,000 between 1990 and 1999. The state
banks retrenched, and BANADES, the main source of agricultural credit,
sharply cut staff and branch offices before closing its doors in 1998 (Enriquez
2010). Once the economy stabilized, the government moved to privatize the
remaining state banks, telecommunications and electricity, and further liber
alized trade under the second structural adjustment plan, which was launched
in 1999 (IMF 1999; Sola Montserrat 2007,130-147).
The country periodically failed to meet budgetary benchmarks due to
heavy debt obligations, natural disaster and political pressures, but policy
change generally advanced along market lines, as Lora’s structural reform
index indicates (see table 1.1). This transition took place in spite of the formal
opposition of the FSLN and its continuing status as the country’s largest
single political party. The rise of an entrepreneurial sector within the FSLN,
which entered vigorously into the openings emerging under the new rules,
raised complex questions about its role in the process.
Nicaragua’s foreign debt had increased from $1.6 billion in 1979, when the
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Somoza government collapsed, to $10.7 billion in 1990, and the debt rose fur
ther to $11.7 billion in 1994. International lenders helped secure some debt
forgiveness, repayment, and rescheduling for Nicaragua, but the total debt
remained very high (Sola Montserrat 2007, 84, 125). Pressure from civil soiety and some Western nations eventually pushed the World Bank and IMF
to increase attention to debt relief. Under their subsequent Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, Nicaragua became a candidate for IMF
monitored debt reduction. Progress was slow, however, and debt obligations
still topped $6.6 billion in 2003, equal to 159% of GDP (BCN n.d., table 17).
The depth of Nicaragua’s economic crisis, foreign debt, and its exceptional
dependence on aid gave external actors special leverage over this transition.
But even in this case, market reform depended on the active cooperation of
local officials who were responsible for day-to-day economic management.
As in the other two Central American countries, technocratic officials im
plemented the detailed schedule agreed upon with the international funders.
Unlike Costa Rica and El Salvador, however, Nicaragua had undergone ten
years of revolution. This experience had ruptured conventional technocratic
ecruitment mechanisms in Nicaragua, and with the virtual disappearance of
USAID during that period, no counterpart to Costa Rica or Salvadoran neoiberal think tanks was in place.30
Nicaraguan technocrats who had left the country during the revolution to
vork in international organizations and business or to pursue graduate de
crees in the United States were now recruited back from self-exile to assume
ugh-level administrative positions.31 Additional administrative support was
provided by INCAE, a prominent Central American business school that
oad transferred programs from its Managua campus to Costa Rica during the
period of the Sandinista Revolution. After the 1990 election, INCAE’s Nica
ragua program expanded and, with USAID financing, it took on technical
Gaining responsibilities for key ministries. According to the 1991 GAO report
U991, 21), 16 top technical advisers in the Central Bank, the newly formed
Ministry of Economy and Development, and other economic agencies had
INCAE affiliations. With $3.3 million in contracts from USAID, INCAE
provided 33 consultants for government and private sector groups and had
organized 54 seminars for over 2,000 public and private sector participants by
March 1992 (USAID 1992, 3-4). Over time, other joint public-private agen
cies and partnerships were created, such as the Export and Investment Center
(Centro de Exportaciones e Inversiones, or CEI) and PRONICARAGUA,
to promote trade and foreign investment (Gobierno de Nicaragua 1996).
Market transition produced some quick benefits. Inflation dropped sharply
hom 13,490% in 1990 to 12% in 1996 (Sola Montserrat 2007,117), providing
great and general relief. Economic growth resumed in 1994, after almost a
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decade of contraction. The average annual GDP growth, which in the 1980 1989 revolutionary period was -1.4%, improved to 2.4% in 1990-1997 and
3.5% in 1998-2003 (ECLAC 2010d, 53). Merchandise exports, which regis
tered an average annual 3.8% decline in 1980-1989, grew an average annual
9.4% in 1990-1999 (ECLAC, 2010e, 69), in part due to the expanding expon
processing zones. Enjoying a 100% tax exemption for 10 years (and 60% there
after) in Nicaragua, the number of EPZ companies increased from 5 (with
a workforce of 1,000) in 1990, to 45 (with a workforce of 37,000) in 2001.
EPZ manufacturing, which represented 1% of export value in 1990, contrib
uted 54% of export value in 2001 (PNUD 2003 129, 133). Non-traditional
agricultural exports became another source of growth, strongly encouraged
by USAID.32
Market reform created winners and losers, and even in the new sectors,
businesses often struggled. Rapid privatization and new regulations lacked
transparency and allowed rent-seeking behavior, and well-placed investors
moved quickly to extract gains (Mayorga 2007). Hardships associated with
the loss of state bank credit and trade protection combined with evidence cf
favoritism to weaken business cohesion around neoliberal adjustments (Spald
ing 1994, 180-184; 1987). The gradual consolidation of the new economy,
however, allowed the beneficiaries of economic opening to gain momentum
and coalesce around market reform. As elsewhere in Central America, power
ful economic groups coalesced, such as the Pellas and Lafise groups, some cf
which built on an economic foundation dating back to the pre-revolutionary7
period. The dominant economic groups quickly extended their investments
across the region, many of them anchored in the rapidly expanding private
banks (Segovia 2005; Mayorga 2007).
As new economic sectors began to emerge, business chambers reorganized
around growth industries. New chambers were established in the banking,
Free Trade Zone and tourism sectors; these associations allowed sectoral
leaders to better coordinate around themes of common interest. As in Costa
Rica and El Salvador, a specialized association for exporters, the Association
of Nicaraguan Producers and Exporters (APEN), was created, with USAID
covering its initial operating expenses (Spalding 1994, 185). By 2005, four
new business chambers had affiliated with COSEP, expanding its coverage in
tourism, fishing, food processing, and exporting (COSEP 2007). Improved
relations with the United States restored trade and investment flows, foster
ing rapid growth of the local AMCHAM (Gonzalez C. 2006).
Business support for the transition was reinforced by the polarized nature
of Nicaraguan politics. After the clashes between business elites and the San
dinista government in the 1980s, which resulted in censorship, prison terms,
and property confiscations, many business association leaders developed
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a sharply adversarial relationship with the FSLN (Spalding 1994). Some,
such as Enrique Bolanos, long-term head of the Superior Council of Private
Enterprise (COSEP), the business peak association, eagerly sought political
leadership in the post-revolutionary era. Electoral competition in 1990,1996,
and 2001 pitted Daniel Ortega, as the perpetual FSLN candidate, against
anti-Sandinista coalitions led by Chamorro, Arnoldo Aleman, and Bolanos,
respectively. To ward off an FSLN victory, a steady majority of both elites and
voters swung against the former revolutionaries, in favor of candidates seek
ing normalized relations with the U.S. and the transition to market economics
that this entailed.33
Across a sixteen-year period, Nicaraguan voters continued to reject the
FSLN and elect presidents who pursued market reform. Chamorro, Aleman,
and Bolanos all won the presidency with substantial majorities, in elections
characterized by strong voter turnout.34 Much like their neighbors in Costa
Rica and El Salvador, Nicaraguans accepted the market system in principle
and expressed this support by voting for market advocates. Public opinion
data reinforces the view that most Nicaraguans supported a general mar
ket transition during this period. When asked, in the Latinobardmetro poll,
whether “the market economy is best for the country,” 73% of respondents
indicated approval (strongly agreed or agreed) in 1998, a figure that rose to
78% in 2002, when it exceeded the Latin American norm by 19 percentage
points (Latinobardmetro 2009, 91).
After the difficulties of hyperinflation, scarcity, and uncertainty com
pounded the miseries of warfare in the 1980s, economic stabilization in the
1990s was greeted with relief. The turbulent experience of “socialism” caused
many to recoil from the economic insecurity associated with centralized con
trols and U.S. hostility. External intervention brought high levels of foreign
assistance to support transition, and, after a painful adjustment, economic
growth resumed. Major development problems endured, and market reform
brought its own set of problems, as we shall see, but the reigning perception
was that the market system was the best alternative for the moment.

Interpretations
Close analysis of these three Central American cases demonstrates the use
fulness of the multiphase theoreticalframework, in which the market reform
process is broken into a series of steps and analysis focuses on the factors
that shape its advance in each (see table 1.3). Three transition stages—initia
tion, deepening, and persistence—involved varying combinations of actors
and processes.

Table 1.3. Market reform processes: Multiphase theoretical framework
Phase

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Nicaragua

Pretransition
economic conditions

• Social democracy

• "Communitarian" episode and civil war

• Revolutionary regime

• Debt crisis

• Wartime economic contraction

• Sharp wartime economic contraction

• Economic contraction

• Extreme debt

• High inflation

• Hyperinflation

Reform initiation
External funders

• U.S. geopolitical interests

• U.S. geopolitical interests

• U.S. geopolitical interests

• Sharp increase in USAID

• Sharp increase in and persistence of

• Sharp increase in USAID funding, fol

funding, followed by IMF and

USAID funding, followed by IMF agree

lowed by multiple IMF stabilization and

World Bank stabilization and

ment, but without sharp economic

structural adjustment agreements and

structural adjustment

crisis

by World Bank and IMF HIPC relief

Reform deepening
Domestic technocrats

• USAID-funded public-private
agencies and think tank
development

• USAID-funded think tank development
• Local technocratic control of key
ministries

• USAID-funded consultancies and tech
nical assistance
• Local technocratic control of key minis
tries, detailed IMF reform agenda

• Local technocratic control of
key ministries
Business support

• Rising power of exporters,
tourism, commerce
• New economic groups
consolidate
• New business associa
tions created, AMCHAM
strengthened

• Rising power of banking, exporters,
commerce

• Rising power of banking, exporters,
commerce

• New economic groups consolidate

• New economic groups consolidate

• New business associations created,

• New business associations created,

AMCHAM strengthened

AMCHAM strengthened

Reform persistence
Parties, coalitions,
candidates

• PLN and PUSC rotation

• ARENA hegemony

• UNO and Liberal Alliance majority

• Pro-market alignment

• FMLN minority

• FSLN minority

Public opinion

• Majority vote favors market

• Majority vote favors market advocates

• Majority vote favors market advocates

• General public endorsement of market

• General public endorsement of market

advocates
• General public endorsement

system

system

Market reform: neoliberalism

Market reform: neoliberalism, with sus

of market system

Outcome

• Market reform: heterodox
neoliberalism

tained supervision
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Reform initiation

Market reform is disruptive and accompanied by costs (Weyland 2002). As
such, it is unlikely to be introduced unless local economic performance de
teriorates and triggers a crisis, discrediting alternative approaches. The eco
nomic crisis is commonly accompanied by strong bouts of inflation and may
follow an extended period of contraction. In the Costa Rican case, market
transition began with a foreign debt crisis that triggered rising inflation and
placed pressure on the reigning social democratic system. In El Salvador,
movement toward the market was fueled less by debt and inflation, which
remained relatively modest, than by wartime polarization and production decline. Revolutionary Nicaragua experienced all of the above, with extreme
debt and hyperinflation following a decade of war and economic contraction.
By itself, however, economic decline does not necessarily lead to neoliberal
reform. A production fall off would tend to foster change, but not necessarily
of the market sort. For marketization to advance, other factors come into play.
Polanyis (2001 [1944], 147) observation that “Laissez faire was planned” pro
vides a useful point of departure.
As the general literature on market reform indicates, external funders
often serve as a catalyst in this process. In the Central American case, the
key external actor in the initiation phase was USAID. With greater agility
than the multilateral lenders and more at stake in the region, the U.S. gov
ernment responded quickly to the opportunity to project its influence in a re
gion of geopolitical significance and to cure Central American ills with mar
ket medicine. In all three cases, USAID provided massive funding, gradually
imposing pointed requirements, including provisions to initiate negotiation
with the IMF.
With a focused mandate, professional staff and training, and the ability to
leverage additional resources through cross-conditionality, the IMF played
a critical role in advancing marketization in this region. Its technical teams
synchronized a timeline of reforms covering trade liberalization, privatiza
tion, and deregulation. The market advance was hardly smooth in any of the
cases, and lending sometimes stalled or was suspended, as in Costa Rica and
Nicaragua. The agency’s legitimation function, however, enhanced the value
of its approval, and the external financial flows it channeled made the pro
cess less painful, hence more likely to be sustained (or renewed following
interruption).
In contrast to findings that link IMF lending to shareholder maneuvers
on behalf of major financial lobbies, USAID and IMF intervention in Cen
tral America were not driven principally by core state financial interests. Un
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ike larger Latin American countries with heavy borrowing concentrated in
a handful of foreign banks, Central American foreign debts were generally
modest in relation to bank portfolios and unlikely to affect bank profitability,
(he Nicaraguan foreign debt, which was the most substantial of the three,
was not primarily with U.S. banks; by the end of the Sandinista period, bor
rowing came largely from socialist countries. Intense U.S. interest in these
cases was more directly connected to the cold war fears of “communist” ex
pansion in a region historically defined as the U.S. “backyard” than to pressure
kom creditors. This catalyst gave neoliberal transition in Central America
some distinctive features, including durable epistemic resource flows into
meal think tanks and training programs, and unilateral, but temporary, mar
ket access under CBI.
Reform Deepening

External funders could not secure a market transition unless local authorities
actively cooperated in this venture. In the Central American cases, economic
duress and war weariness fueled electoral transitions, and a new network
of officials and technocrats emerged who endorsed policy change. Beyond
imply signing onto the agreements reached with external funders, these offi
cials provided on-going support for transition. Their numbers tended to in
crease over time, as new government agencies and private partnerships were
established, and they gradually populated the corner offices and cubicles of
Key ministries. These officials came to serve as powerful norm entrepreneurs,
reshaping the dominant ideas about how an economy should function.
Some who assumed technical leadership at the domestic level had long
seen persuaded to abandon the old model, and were waiting in the wings
for the opportunity to serve. Others had gone into self-exile or for gradu
ate study abroad during periods of heightened statism, and had served stints
as technocrats in multilateral banks and international business management.
The change of leadership at home now offered a propitious moment to return
and contribute directly to the economic revamping. Prior USAID institu
tion building helped to foster the transition by providing training and net
working opportunities for market-oriented actors. USAID financial support
for the market friendly Academia de Centroamerica, CINDE and COMEX
ln Costa Rica, for example, created a network of public and private insti
tutions that would serve as local sponsors of marketization. FUSADES in
El Salvador networked with international economic experts to design policy
reforms, over time developing the expertise to complete policy planning in
house. Market reform-oriented governments in Nicaragua drew on resources
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available at INCAE, and nationals with foreign training and expertise staffed
critical ministries in charge of finance, trade, and development.
Local bureaucracies, of course, were not completely replaced following
election transitions, even when they were substantially downsized, as in Nica
ragua. Market-oriented officials were often layered into agencies formed in an
earlier era. Those public officials who failed to display sufficient confidence in
liberalization, however, were commonly sidelined as inadequately prepared,
anachronistic, and “politicized.” Through executive decrees, administrative
rule changes, and hard-fought legislative battles, market reform policies were
propagated.
Still, market transition requires more than the creation of a new policy
framework. For the reforms to take root, producers and investors need to re
spond to the unfolding opportunities and reorganize production processes—
to become “flexible rent seekers” rather that intractable ones, seeking govern
ment support under the new rules rather than insisting on the old. Because
business elites tend to pursue concrete economic interests rather than an ab
stract set of principles, their commitment to market reform can be variable.
Privatization and deregulation provide ample opportunities for favoritism, as
the general literature on market reform demonstrates, and insider allegations
of corruption appear regularly in Central America. In this region too, market
transition in practice deviated from market transition theory.
But over time, Central American business elites moved into the open
ing sectors and successfully identified new markets. Once legal changes al
lowed for the establishment of private banking, elites founded domestic and
regional banks that anchored new economic networks in all three countries.
The CBI opened markets in the United States for nontraditional products
and local producers found niche markets. Real estate revived, sprawling malls
sprang up, and, as the transportation and telecommunications infrastructure
expanded, tourism, particularly in Costa Rica, became a new growth indus
try. Importers relished the ease with which they could supply the expanding
consumer market with foreign goods and brands.
One by one, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua developed new
export-oriented manufacturing activities, distinctively tailored to local labor
skills and costs. El Salvador and Nicaragua offered lowcost labor and secured
jobs in the apparel sector; Costa Rica, where educational levels and salaries
were higher, offered safety and quality control and secured investment in the
computer and medical equipment sectors. Exports surged in each of these
countries, albeit more slowly than imports, and foreign investment generally
increased as well, albeit at widely varying rates. Traditional sectors, such as
coffee cultivation, declined sharply in the new economy. Except in Nicaragua,
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the agricultural sector in general lost much of its significance. Business asso
ciational life reconfigured around the new economy, with new chambers pro
viding robust support for market reform, as some historical ones lost ground.
Reform Persistence

Political and economic elites can introduce market change, in cooperation
with external allies, but in political systems that are formally democratic,
those changes are unlikely to persist unless the new model secures public ac
ceptance. Parties and candidates need to sell the virtues of market reform and
to resist the temptation to backslide; voters must demonstrate some buy-in.
Although endorsement of neoliberal reform was far from unambiguous in
Central America, as subsequent chapters demonstrate, ideational processes
stoked a new “common sense,” (Harvey 2005, 39-43) in which free market
competition and global integration were widely understood to provide the
only real road to modernity, and the means to leave instability, crisis, and
warfare behind.
In Costa Rica, the formerly social democratic PLN and the Christian
Democratic PUSC converged around the need for market efficiency and
global integration, thus stabilizing market reform in spite of party rotation.
Although leaders from these two parties tended to endorse market policies
that went beyond public preferences, such as telecommunications privatiza
tion, elites steered clear of the privatization of social services, and mass sen
timent generally lined up behind the hybrid reform model that emerged in
this country.
In El Salvador, pro-market ARENA enjoyed solid victories at the presi
dential level, and its stable working relationship with a traditional clientelistic party generally provided the legislative support needed to advance a promarket agenda. Ideological antagonism toward the opposition FMLN rallied
even centrists, as ARENA discourse fanned fears of Left radicalism and the
loss of U.S. aid.
Opponents of the FSLN in Nicaragua likewise benefited from ideological
polarization, recruiting the anti-Sandinista vote in broad coalitions. Memo
ries of the devastation associated with the revolutionary period tended to
strengthen resistance to FSLN campaigns. Business leaders played an active
role in these electoral victories; indeed, in El Salvador and Nicaragua, busi
ness elites repeatedly vied for and won the presidency itself, and prominent
business owners provided critical party leadership and financing.
The experience of revolutionary conflict and civil war in this region stiff
ened the resolution of the Right and tilted the Center away from actors tarred
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with the “socialist” brush. But voters could hardly be persuaded to endorse
candidates and parties that ushered in market reform unless they associated
these reforms with prospective opportunities and benefits. These perceptions
were assisted by concerted ideational projects that emanated from elite insti
tutions (think tanks, media), but they were not without material ground
ing. The governments’ success in controlling inflation and restarting growth
helped to make this case, as did their ability to secure foreign assistance,
which allowed an import boom and increased availability of consumer goods.
Positive attitudes toward a market system prevailed, even when these goods
were out of reach for many and assessments of actual market impacts were
mixed.
Central America entered the twenty-first century having undergone a neo
liberal transition, with economies reorganized around trade and foreign in
vestment, and national discourse focused on recovery and competition. These
were the circumstances under which CAFTA was introduced.

